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Transatlantic security relations are still characterized by the difficulty in finding a 
balance between the need to fight effectively against terrorism and organized crime, and 
the need to safeguard fundamental rights and, in particular, the protection of personal 
data. Since 29 March 2011, the European Union has been negotiating with the United 
States government an international framework agreement (the so-called ‘Umbrella 
Agreement’) in order to protect personal data transferred between the EU and the US for 
law-enforcement purposes. The NSA scandal further reaffirms the need to negotiate an 
Umbrella Agreement that ensures access for EU citizens to the US judicial system and a 
right to redress under the same conditions as US citizens.  
Since the US is now willing to extend the right of redress to the EU citizens, it 
seems that one the main challenges affecting the negotiations have been resolved. The 
aim of this paper is to analyse to what extent the Umbrella Agreement contributes to 
striking a balance between the fight against terrorism and other serious crimes, and the 
protection of civil liberties and fundamental freedoms. This contribution will also assess 
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whether trust in the EU-US data flows has been rebuilt after the NSA scandal and the 
Parliamentary enquiry that has taken place in the EU. 
The PNR and SWIFT Agreements fall within the scope of the current 
negotiations for an agreement between the EU and the US on the exchange of personal 
data in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.1 On 3 
December 2010, the Council authorised the opening of the negotiations for an 
agreement between the EU and the US on the protection of personal data when 
transferred and processed for the purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting or 
prosecuting criminal offences, including terrorism, in the framework of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This proposal was included in the Action Plan 
Implementing the Stockholm Programme.2 The objective was to negotiate an umbrella 
agreement that would provide for a coherent set of data protection standards in the 
relations between the EU and the US. However, this agreement would not constitute the 
legal basis for any specific transfers of personal data. A specific legal basis for such 
data transfers would always be required. The conclusion of this agreement would only 
provide for a higher level of protection of personal data to the extent that it contained 
additional rules to the specific agreements on data transfer. It would also be required to 
ensure the effective application of data protection rules and their supervision by 
independent authorities. Unfortunately, the negotiations have advanced very slowly3. 
The access by US intelligence agencies to private data has seriously eroded 
transatlantic trust in the transfer of personal data. The negative impact that the NSA 
scandal had on transatlantic relations is further exacerbated by the lack of an effective 
judicial remedy for EU citizens under US law, particularly in cases of surveillance 
activities for intelligence purposes. Furthermore, the NSA scandal posed the need for 
genuine parliamentary oversight of the illegal surveillance activities developed by the 
American authorities, which could amount to an infringement of the SWIFT and PNR 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See European Commission, ‘European Commission ready to start talks with US on personal data 
agreement to fight terrorism or crime’, Press Release, 3 December 2010, available at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1661> (last visited 3 October 2013). 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions-Delivering an area of freedom, security and 
justice for Europe's citizens-Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final. 
3 See S. in’t Veld, ‘Transatlantic Relations and security – Reflections from a Politician, Practitioner and 
Litigator’, in E. Fahey & D. Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the 
Relationship between the EU and US legal orders (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), pp. 
237-245. 
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Agreements4. Since the inquiry into the American surveillance activities constituted an 
unprecedented test for democratic accountability in the EU, the Parliament had an 
excellent opportunity to enhance its role in transatlantic security relations. The LIBE 
Committee Inquiry on Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens finished its report 
on January 2014 and the European Parliament adopted its resolution on March 20145. 
This paper aims to analyse firstly, the extent to which the NSA scandal has 
damaged trust in EU-US transfer of data. PNR and SWIFT already raised serious 
concerns regarding breaches of data protection rights of EU citizens but the NSA 
scandal constituted the last straw in the already troubled waters of transatlantic data 
exchanges. While PNR and SWIFT are not the only existing data transfer agreements 
between the EU and the US, they are the most contentious. Secondly, this paper will try 
to examine whether the Umbrella Agreement can contribute to rebuilding trust in EU-
US relations by laying down a sufficient and effective framework for data protection in 
the context of transatlantic cooperation. For that purpose, this paper will first look at the 
implications of the NSA scandal for trust in transatlantic data relations. Secondly, the 
challenges to transfers of data in EU-US relations will be examined, paying particular 
attention to weak level of protection in SWIFT and PNR as well as to their review 
process and issues of accountability. Thirdly, an analysis of the Commission’s Non-
Paper on the state of play of negotiations on the Umbrella Agreement will serve as a 
ground to assess whether the agreed proposals will provide sufficient safeguards against 
the identified concerns. Finally, provisional conclusions will be drawn on the basis of 
the current state of negotiations.  
2. The Implications of the NSA Scandal for Trust in Transatlantic Data Relations 
In June 2013, the press revealed that the US authorities had accessed and 
processed on a large scale the personal data of EU citizens using online serve providers. 
The EU institutions expressed serious concerns over PRISM and other such 
programmes implemented by the National Security Agency (NSA), since these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of 
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ L 195, 27.7.2010, p. 5–14; Agreement between the United 
States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of passenger name records to the 
United States Department of Homeland Security, OJ L 215, 11.8.2012, p. 5–14. 
5 European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance 
bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic 
cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (2013/2188(INI)) 
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initiatives could entail a serious violation of the fundamental rights of EU citizens and 
residents, and called on the US authorities to provide the EU with full information on 
such programmes.6 The European Parliament opened an investigation into the matter in 
order to assess the impact of the US surveillance programmes regarding fundamental 
rights, in particular the right to respect for private life and communications, freedom of 
expression, the presumption of innocence and the right to an effective remedy. Some 
MEPs raised the possibility of suspending or even terminating the SWIFT and PNR 
Agreements during the hearings on the NSA surveillance programmes.7  
The Parliament considered in its report that it has not been clarified whether US 
intelligence agencies have accessed SWIFT financial messages in the EU by 
intercepting SWIFT networks or banks’ communication networks, alone or in 
cooperation with EU national intelligence agencies, and without having recourse to 
existing bilateral channels for mutual legal assistance and judicial cooperation. 8 
Therefore, the Parliament asked the Commission to suspend the application of the TFTP 
Agreement. As regards the PNR Agreement, the Parliament expressed its concerns 
because the great majority of PNR data are saved in cloud systems operating on US soil 
under US law, which lacks data protection adequacy. It does not seem that the 
Commission and the Council are willing to suspend the application of the SWIFT and 
PNR Agreements, which constitutes a serious decision that could negatively affect 
transatlantic relations and, in particular, the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP). 
The NSA scandal further reaffirms the need to negotiate a transatlantic framework 
agreement on the protection of personal data that ensures access for EU citizens to the 
US judicial system and the right to redress at the very least in the same conditions as US 
citizens.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Commissioner Reding letter to the US Attorney General, Eric Holder, 10 June 2013; Statement by 
the President of the European Council, 11 July 2013; European Parliament resolution on the US National 
Agency surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU 
citizens’ privacy, 2 July 2013. 
7 European Parliament, ‘MEPs raise suspension of EU-US bank data deal’, press release, 24 September 
2013. 
8 European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance 
bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic 
cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (2013/2188(INI)). 
9 The access to justice and the redress system is very weak in the SWIFT and PNR agreements. See E. 
Fahey, ‘Law and Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: Rights, Redress, and 
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3. Challenges to the Transfer of Data from the EU to the US 
3.1. The weak protection of personal data in the SWIFT and PNR Agreements 
Even though some of the concerns raised by the European Parliament as regards the 
2009 SWIFT agreement found a satisfactory solution in the 2010 SWIFT Agreement, 
data protection provisions are not satisfactory10. There are no remarkable differences 
between the first and second SWIFT agreements. Since the European Parliament was 
involved during the negotiation process, it was more pleased to accept the second 
SWIFT compromise 11 . The Parliament was fully informed at all stages of the 
negotiations and its views were taken into account by the actors involved in the process. 
The 2010 SWIFT Agreement is not fully satisfactory with respect to the protection 
of personal data. Firstly, the system is still based on the bulk transfer of data, because 
SWIFT does not technically allow targeted searches. The European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) held that ‘the fact that the current SWIFT system does not allow a 
targeted search cannot be considered as a sufficient justification to make bulk data 
transfers lawful according to EU data protection law’.12 The transmission of bulk data 
does not meet the proportionality and necessity requirements. Secondly, it is not 
acceptable that the Agreement allows keeping non-extracted data for five years. Thirdly, 
as regards judicial review, the Agreement explicitly states that the agreement ‘shall not 
create or confer any right or benefit on any person or entity, private or public’ (Article 
18). The EDPS pointed out that ‘this provision seems to annul or at least question the 
binding effect of those provisions of the agreement providing for data subjects’ rights 
which are currently neither recognised nor enforceable under US law, in particular when 
data subjects are non US citizens or permanent residents’. In consequence, the 
provisions to protect the rights of EU citizens would not give access to any kind of 
judicial review in the US.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Remedies in EU-US Passenger Name Records and the Terrorism Finance Tracking Program’, (2013) 
Yearbook of European Law, pp. 1-21. 
10 On the review of the implementation of the agreement, see S. in’t Veld, supra note 3. 
11 See J. Santos Vara, ‘Transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation agreements on the transfer of personal 
data: a test for democratic accountability in the EU’, in E. Fahey & D. Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic 
Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US legal orders 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), pp. 256-288. 
12 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a Council Decision on the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ 2010, C 355/12. 
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Similarly to the 2010 SWIFT Agreement, the new PNR Agreement provides 
stronger protection of EU citizens’ right to privacy than the 2007 EU-US PNR 
Agreement. EU citizens will have the right to access their own PNR data and seek 
corrections, including the possibility of erasure or blocking, of his or her PNR data. 
However, the PNR Agreement concluded with the US is not satisfactory from the 
perspective of EU protection of fundamental rights. The most serious concerns were not 
removed. Firstly, the processing of PNR data is allowed not only for the purpose of 
preventing and prosecuting terrorism and serious transnational crimes. The data may 
also be used to investigate and prosecute ‘other crimes that are punishable by a sentence 
of imprisonment of three years or more and that are transnational in nature’.13 Secondly, 
Article 4(2) allows for the use of PNR ‘if ordered by a court’.14 This clause would allow 
the use of PNR for any purpose, provided that it is ordered by a court. Thirdly, the 2011 
PNR Agreement retains data almost indefinitely. The data shall be retained for an initial 
period of five years and then in a dormant data basis for a period of up to ten years. 
Following the dormant period, data retained must be rendered fully anonymised. 
Fourthly, even though the Agreement recognises that any individual may seek 
administrative and judicial redress in accordance with U.S. law,15 it does not amount to 
admit a judicial redress equivalent to the right to effective judicial redress in the EU.16 
Article 21 explicitly states that the Agreement ‘shall not create or confer, under U.S. 
law, any right or benefit on any person or entity, private or public’. Finally, it is not 
acceptable that data may also be used to ensure border security. According to Article 
4(3) ‘PNR may be used and processed by DHS to identify persons who would be 
subject to closer questioning or examination upon arrival to or departure from the 
United States or who may require further examination’.  
3.2. The review process of the PNR and SWIFT Agreements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Justice and Home Affairs, Draft Recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security (17433/2011–C7-
0511/2011–2011/0382(NLE)), 30 January 2012. 
14 PNR may be used and processed on a case-by-case basis where necessary in view of a serious threat 
and for the protection of vital interests of any individual or if ordered by a court. 
15 Art. 13 PNR Agreement, supra note 4. 
16 See also the Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Council 
Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the United States of America and the European 
Union on the use and transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security, OJ C 35, 9.2.2012, p. 16–22. 
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There are many review mechanisms in the PNR and SWIFT agreements concluded with 
the United States. The operation of the reviews of these two Agreements shows the 
weaknesses of governance in transatlantic security. 17  In order to understand the 
shortcomings presented by the accountability mechanism in the transfer of data from the 
EU to the US, it is crucial to briefly examine the main results arising from the periodic 
review of the of PNR and SWIFT Agreements. 
Article 13 of the SWIFT Agreement provides for regular joint reviews of the 
safeguards, controls, and reciprocity provisions to be conducted by review teams from 
the EU and the US, including the Commission, the US Treasury Department and 
representatives of two data protection authorities from Member States. The review 
process may also include security and data protection experts and persons with judicial 
experience. The first joint review of the Agreement took place in February 2011 and 
covered the period of the first six months after the entry into force of the Agreement18.  
The EU review team concluded that the Agreement has been implemented in 
accordance with its provisions, including the data protection provisions. The EU 
recommended to give more public information on the way the program functions, in as 
far as this is possible, without endangering the effectiveness of the Program. The 
conclusions of the second review, that took place two years after the entry into force of 
the Agreement, were also very optimist19. According to the Commission’s report, the 
implementation of the agreement has reached a very satisfactory level with also the EU 
increasingly profiting from it under the specific reciprocity arrangements. 
As regards the third joint review that took place in April 2014, the Commission 
affirmed to be fully satisfied with the Agreement and with the proper implementation of 
its safeguards and controls.20 The Commission pointed out that the consultations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 E. Fahey, supra note 9.  
18 Commission Staff Working Document Report on the joint review of the implementation of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer 
of Financial Messaging data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 17-18 February 2011, SEC(2011) 438 final, 30.3.2011. 
19 Commission Staff Working Document Report on the second joint review of the implementation of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer 
of Financial Messaging data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program October 2012, SWD(2012) 454 final, 14.12.2012. 
20 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the joint review of the 
implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, COM(2014) 513 final, 11.8.2014. 
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conducted with the US after the NSA Scandal led to the conclusion that the US 
authorities had not obtained information from SWIFT outside of the TFTP Agreement. 
Therefore, the safeguards and controls included in the agreement were properly 
respected and implemented.  
Europol is responsible for verifying whether the US request complies with the 
requirements of the Agreement, including the protection of personal data. It must be 
highlighted that the Agreement itself does not expressly contemplate the possibility that 
Europol should reject the transfer of data requested by the US, and indeed no transfer of 
data has as yet been rejected by Europol.21 Europol has been heavily criticized for 
carrying out this role, but is a task that it did not ask to be responsible for and which is 
not clearly described in its mandate.22 Within the field of data protection, the agency is 
subject to the Europol Joint Supervisory Body (EJSB).23 The EJSB does not, however, 
have the capacity to block the transfer of unnecessary or disproportionate data to the US 
authorities. It must be pointed out that the European Parliament is not allowed either to 
supervise Europol intervention under the SWIFT Agreement.24 The classification of this 
type of information as ‘EU Secret’ blocks any possibility for the Parliament to provide 
meaningful supervision of the implementation of the mandate conferred on Europol. 
As regards to the 2011 PNR Agreement, Article 23 of provides for a joint review of 
its implementation one year after its entry into force (on 1 July 2012). The review was 
carried out in July 2013 by two teams represented, on the US side, by officials from the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and, for the EU, by Commission officials and 
two Member State experts on data protection and law enforcement25. The report 
concluded that the operation of the agreement was satisfactory. It noted that DHS has an 
effective mechanism to filter out PNR data which have no clear connection to the US or 
which go beyond the categories of PNR data listed in the Agreement. The use of PNR 
data is consistent with the purpose limitations set out in the Agreement and ‘follows an 
approach allowing [DHS] to maximise the added value of using PNR for law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 ‘Europol JSB inspects for the second year the implementation of the TFTP Agreement’, Europol JSB 
Press Statement, Brussels, 14 March 2012. 
22 European Parliament, Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence agencies in the European 
Union, 2011, p. 46. 
23 Art. 34 of Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing a European Police Office (Europol), OJ L 
121/37, 15.5.2009.  
24 See E. Fahey, supra note 9; J. Santos Vara, supra note 11. 
25 Joint Review of the implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name records to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, SEC (2013) 630 final, 27.11.2013.  
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enforcement purposes’. PNR data are held securely and subject to appropriate access 
controls. Although the Agreement authorises the use and processing of sensitive data ‘in 
exceptional circumstances’, this provision has not been used during the first year of 
operation of the Agreement, and internal DHS rules require the Commission to be 
notified within 48 hours if sensitive data are accessed. The report notes that the sharing 
of PNR data with other domestic (US) agencies or its onward transfer to other third 
countries remains limited. A further joint review will take place during the first half of 
2015, followed by a formal joint evaluation of the Agreement in 2016.  
The review process of PNR and SWIFT Agreements demonstrates that the 
shortcomings of governance in the transatlantic transfer of personal data are not yet 
overcome. All the signs are that the Commission has opted for facilitating the rebuilding 
of trust in the transfer of data to the USA within the framework of SWIFT and PNR 
agreements. Despite the fact that the NSA scandal made clear that the USA had very 
possibly accessed EU data protected by SWIFT and PNR outside the framework of 
these agreements, after the implementation review process carried out in 2014, the 
Commission has seemed fully satisfied. 
 
4. The EU-US Umbrella Agreement: Much Ado About Nothing? 
Many of the concerns raised by data protection deficits in transatlantic counter-terrorism 
relations and pointed out in this paper were supposed to be solved via the so called 
‘Umbrella Agreement’ currently being negotiated by the EU and the US.  The 
negotiations of this agreement started as a result of the mandate of the Council of 3 
December 2010, authorising the Commission to open the negotiations, under Article 
218(10) TFEU. Negotiations formally opened on 29 March 2011 and despite their slow 
pace are at the time of writing at an advanced stage, although some questions, 
particularly those regarding judicial redress for EU nationals in the US, remain 
contentious26. 
As it is concluded under Article 218(10) TFEU and under a substantive AFSJ 
legal basis, the European Parliament will play a key role in its conclusion. That is to be 
welcomed in light of the role that the European Parliament, and the LIBE Committee in 
particular, have played in the negotiations of SWIFT or PNR agreements, albeit at times 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 EU-US Negotiations on an agreement to protect personal information exchanged in the context of 
fighting crime and terrorism, MEMO/11/203, Brussels, 29 March 2011. 
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lead more by its will to assert its influence in the conclusion of international agreements 
rather than to protect fundamental rights of EU citizens27. Particularly bearing in mind 
the relevance that digital rights had in the 2014 EP campaign, the EP could put the 
Commission under pressure in fighting for a stronger agreement with the possibility of 
rejection if the resulting Umbrella Agreement does not meet EU standards28. 
As has been previously mentioned, the Umbrella Agreement is not supposed to 
act as a legal basis for data transfer, for which other legal mechanisms are already in 
place. On the contrary, it aims to provide with a satisfactory solution for data protection 
in EU-US transfer of data for security purposes. It therefore aims ‘to ensure a high level 
of protection of personal information and to enhance cooperation between the US and 
the EU for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences’29. Furthermore, this agreement would contribute to ensuring the coherence 
between EU-US counterterrorism cooperation and European values, currently 
challenged by the differences regarding data protection standards existing in the EU and 
the US30. Such a framework would be expected to lead to an overarching common 
understanding of privacy at the transatlantic level31.  
As has been pointed out previously in this paper, while the Parliament had been 
sufficiently involved in the negotiations leading up to the 2010 SWIFT Agreement and 
the new PNR Agreement, serious shortcomings as to the protection of personal data of 
EU citizens remained. Particularly, concerns were raised regarding SWIFT and PNR 
over retention periods, although they were notably striking in PNR. According to the 
Commission’s Non-Paper, the concerns regarding retention periods could be solved 
through the establishment of ‘specific retention periods’ in order to ensure the 
requirements of necessity and appropriateness. To meet the requirement of 
appropriateness, the duration of retention periods shall take account of the purposes of 
processing or use, as well as the nature of the data and their impact on rights of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See J. Santos Vara, supra note 11, at 276. 
28 I. Brown, ‘The Feasibility of Transatlantic Privacy-Protective Standards for Surveillance’, (2014) 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 1-18, at 13.  
29 Non-Paper on State of play of negotiations on EU-US data protection ‘Umbrella Agreement’, 8761/14, 
Brussels, 09.04.2014, at 3.  
30 V. Mitsilegas, ‘Transatlantic counterterrorism cooperation and European values: the elusive quest for 
coherence’, in E. Fahey & D. Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on 
the Relationship between the EU and US legal orders (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014), 
pp. 289-315, at 312. 
31 Ibid. 
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individuals affected32. While the Commission praises those accomplishments, it is to be 
seen where specific retention periods will be laid down. Presumably, they would be 
enshrined in agreements granting legal basis for data transfers. Secondly, necessity and 
appropriateness remain rather broad concepts and open to interpretation. Rather or 
besides appropriateness, it would be preferable to see in the final text of the agreement 
an element of proportionality, as is the case of other instruments in the EU regarding 
limitations to data protection rights33. The principle of proportionality also includes an 
element of appropriateness insofar as it requires interferences to rights to ‘[1] be 
appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and 
[2] do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve 
those objectives’34.  
Furthermore, while certain limitations on rights such as those found in the 
annulled Data Retention Directive tend to meet the necessity test, it is in the second 
strand of the proportionality test where they fail35. That is the case for excessive data 
retention periods, which is what is at issue here. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that the 
lack of the proportionality element is just a drafting error in the Non-paper that will be 
corrected in the proposal submitted to the Parliament and the Council. Otherwise, the 
Parliament should not accept such a flagrant limitation of citizens’ rights.  
In view of the broad scope for interpretation of these concepts, it is understood 
that these requirements will only be effective if combined with adequate means of 
judicial review that enable an independent court or tribunal to scrutinise the 
interpretation of the administration, particularly since in view of the process of review 
of the SWIFT and PNR Agreements it appears that to the Commission the retention 
periods laid down in SWIFT and PNR are ‘appropriate’36. Even then, it is rather likely 
that without further concretization in substantive agreements laying down the legal basis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Non-Paper on State of play of negotiations on EU-US data protection ‘Umbrella Agreement’, supra 
note 29, at 6.  
33 See recital 4 of the preamble in Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 54–63; Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,   OJ L 281 , 23/11/1995 pp. 31 – 50.  
34 Case C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, judgment of the Court of 8 April 2014, nyr, para. 
46. 
35 Ibid., para. 69.  
36 See the Report on the joint review of the implementation of the SWIFT agreement, supra note 20, and 
the Joint Review of the implementation of the PNR Agreement, supra note 25. 
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for the transfer of data, necessity and appropriateness will be understood differently not 
only by the law enforcement authorities on each side of the Atlantic, but also by the 
judiciaries.  
The SWIFT and the PNR Agreements involve the transfer of data of a broad 
quantity of individuals, not necessarily in connection with terrorism or a serious crime 
due to the system on which they are based (e.g. bulk transfer for SWIFT). This can be 
considered in light of the Court’s ruling in Digital Rights Ireland, where it held that, 
concerning data retention periods, clear and precise rules governing the extent of the 
interference are required and it highlighted the fact that no distinction was made as to 
the categories of data regarding retention periods on the basis of the usefulness for the 
purposes of the objective pursued or according to the persons concerned37. The Non-
Paper was issued just a day after the Court ruled on this issue. It is to be hoped that the 
Court’s findings will be considered in the drafting of the proposal of the Umbrella 
Agreement on this point.  
This latter point brings the debate to another troublesome element of the PNR 
Agreement: the fact that the processing of PNR data was allowed for other purposes 
than countering or preventing terrorism and other serious forms of transnational crime, 
but also for other crimes of over three years imprisonment which would be transnational 
in nature. In our view, those concerns will not be solved by the proposals included in 
the Non-Paper. In fact, both sides agreed that the ‘umbrella agreement will cover 
personal data transferred for purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences’38. This is even broader than the terms included in the 
PNR data, which included the 3-year-plus requirement. This element is positive insofar 
as it will broaden the protection for all kinds of transfer of data for crime prevention 
purposes. It is also the purpose of concluding an Umbrella Agreement, as otherwise it 
would constantly need to be amended in order to broaden its scope should the need 
arise. However, it could in turn also lead to a new wave of agreements granting legal 
basis for transfer of data regarding petty crimes since decision-makers would 
understand that the Umbrella Agreement already provides sufficient guaranties.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Digital Rights Ireland, supra note 34, paras. 63-66.  
38 Non-Paper on State of play of negotiations on EU-US data protection ‘Umbrella Agreement’, supra 
note 29, at 4.  
DRAFT PAPER – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 
	   13 
On this issue, the fact that the PNR data could be used for any purpose if ordered 
by a Court is to be recalled. In this sense, the Umbrella Agreement might shed some 
light and restrict this possibility insofar as it imposes a requirement of prior consent of 
the competent authority which originally sent the data in order to transfer it to a Third 
State or international organisation. Therefore, under the said provision of the PNR 
Agreement, transfers to Third States ordered by a Court for a different purpose could be 
covered, inter alia for migration-control purposes. Under the Umbrella Agreement, it 
appears that these hypothetical scenarios would be limited by a requirement of consent 
which should take account of the purpose for which the data was transferred and of 
whether the Third State or international organisation in question grants an appropriate 
level of protection39. Again, what an appropriate level of protection is in the terms of the 
Umbrella Agreement could be put into question. 
On substantive principles of data protection, another element that questioned the 
necessity and proportionality of transatlantic data transfers was the transfer of bulk data 
justified by the fact that it was only possible to transfer bulk data under SWIFT. In fact, 
in light of Digital Rights Ireland, it is likely that should its concluding decision be taken 
to the Court of Justice via an action for annulment, it would be annulled on similar 
grounds. While the Non-Paper does not include substantive provisions on this question, 
it could be that the provisions on ‘Automated Decision-Making’ could have some 
relevance. Indeed, one of the problems raised by the transfer of bulk data, is that data of 
regular citizens would be transferred and they could be used for profiling. The same 
would be the case for profiling on the basis of PNR data retained for an almost 
indefinite period of time. These provisions therefore seem to provide some guarantees 
regarding decisions based on automated processing of information, such as profiling. 
However, whether these safeguards are sufficient in the eyes of the European citizen is 
also in question. 
The Non-Paper states that as a matter of principle decisions negatively affecting 
the relevant interests of an individual cannot be adopted if they are based solely on 
automated processing of information40. This prohibition applies unless it is authorised 
by domestic law. In that case, decisions negatively affecting the relevant interests of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Non-Paper on State of play of negotiations on EU-US data protection ‘Umbrella Agreement’, supra 
note 29, at 7.  
40 Ibid., at 8. 
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individual could be based solely on an automated processing of information provided 
that ‘appropriate safeguards are in place, including the possibility to obtain human 
intervention’41. A prohibition of this kind is certainly not sufficient to counter the 
pernicious effects of bulk transfers. If the discussed exemptions are added, the narrow 
scope of the prohibition can also be perceived. A requirement to be authorised by 
domestic law shows that the EU can leave data protection of EU citizens to the 
authorisation by US law. While the possibility of including human review is to be 
welcomed, it is not sufficient. 
An important element of concern raised in the failed SWIFT agreement for the 
EU was raised by the differences between enforcement mechanisms under EU and US 
law. According to the EDPS, the US lacked an independent oversight mechanism42. An 
attempt to solving this issue, at least to some extent, was already included in the 2010 
SWIFT agreement, and has been considered acceptable by the Commission in the 
review process of the SWIFT agreement43. This is also reinforced in the Non-Paper for 
the Umbrella Agreement, which requires effective oversight mechanisms. They shall 
put in place public authorities exercising independent oversight functions and powers, 
including investigation, intervention and review. They must be able to act upon 
complaints made by individuals relating to the measures implementing the agreement44. 
The Non-Paper takes account of the particularities of the US system but understands 
that a combination of supervisory authorities can cumulatively exercise the oversight 
functions entrusted to Data Protection Authorities in the EU. This combination of 
authorities is similar to that put in place for the SWIFT agreement and has been 
accepted by the Commission45. 
What is absent from the Non-Paper and where agreement has not been reached is 
the fundamental issue of judicial redress. As has been previously pointed out, many of 
the possible improvements can only be effective insofar as adequate means of redress 
are put in place, including the possibility of EU citizens to seek judicial review before 
US courts. There is already a theoretical possibility to seek judicial review under Article 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid. 
42 EDPS, supra note 12, para. 36.  
43 V. Mitsilegas, supra note 30, at 301; Report on the joint review of the implementation of the SWIFT 
agreement, supra note 20, at 15. 
44 Non-Paper on State of play of negotiations on EU-US data protection ‘Umbrella Agreement’, supra 
note 29, at 14. 
45 See Report on the joint review of the implementation of the SWIFT agreement, supra note 20, at 31-32.  
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13 of the PNR Agreement and Article 18 of the SWIFT Agreement, but the reality of 
this review is doubtful in view of the omission of the US Privacy Act of 1974 in these 
articles46.	   In this sense, before stepping down, Attorney General Holder agreed with 
Vice-President Reding on the Obama Administration’s commitment towards seeking 
legislation that would give EU nationals the same rights that those granted to US 
nationals47. Commissioner Jurova has welcomed the US commitment and the proposal 
tabled for Congress, although is waiting to see the details of the proposal48. 	  
In absence of further information on the amendment to be proposed by the 
Obama Administration, the remarks by former Attorney General Holder, while they are 
to be welcomed, raise a number of concerns as to EU data protection standards. The 
proposed amendment seems to be based on equal treatment for EU and US nationals by 
granting redress for ‘intentional or wilful disclosures of protected information’, 
following the logic of the US Privacy Act 197449. If this is to be implemented, EU 
citizens will enjoy the same possibilities of redress as US citizens. However, this would 
entail that, while enjoying judicial review to the same extent as US citizens, they would 
not enjoy the benefits derived from the agreement and thus would see their rights under 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights diminished50. What is particularly striking is that EU 
citizens would only be protected by the possibility to enjoy judicial review if the 
disclosure of their data by US agencies is ‘intentional or wilful’.  
It is true that the Non-Paper includes points on notification of data security 
incidents which requires appropriate action to mitigate the damage be promptly taken. 
This would call for a notification to the data provider and, ‘where appropriate given the 
circumstances of the incident’ [emphasis added] to the individual concerned. Exceptions 
to this rule will be exhaustively listed and correspond to reasonable limitations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See E. Fahey, supra note 9, at 9-10, 13-15. 
47 Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, ‘Attorney General Holder Pledges Support for 
Legislation to Provide E.U. Citizens with Judicial Redress in Cases of Wrongful Disclosure of Their 
Personal Data Transferred to the US for Law Enforcement Purposes’, 25 June 2014.  
48 Commissioner Věra Jourová's remarks before the European Parliament's Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee - 21 January 2015 
49 Department of Justice, supra note 47.  
50 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Working Document on future European 
Union (EU) – United States of America (US) international agreement on the protection of personal data 
when transferred and processed for the purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting 
criminal offences, including terrorism, in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, 14.7.2014, p. 5.  
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according to the Non-Paper51. While this notification obligation encompasses other 
breaches than those being intentional or wilful, an obligation of notification is not 
sufficient in order to fulfil the EU requirements of data protection and sufficient means 
of administrative and judicial redress going further than cases of ‘intentional or wilful’ 
disclosures of data should be put in place. Whether the amendment of the US Privacy 
Act 1974 proposed by the Obama Administration will entail sufficient guarantees in this 
sense is to be seen. Otherwise, mutual recognition and mutual trust in countries where 
differences are so fundamental may be easier said than done52. Means of judicial review 
could in that case be established directly in the agreement, although this may not be 
adopted by US authorities.  
Finally, another pending and quite relevant issue is whether the Umbrella 
Agreement, if finally adopted, will apply retroactively to transfers already performed 
under already concluded agreements. This is a key element to the rebuilding of trust in 
transatlantic data relations in view of the possible breaches of data transfer agreements 
operated as a result of the PRISM programme that lead to the NSA scandal. Besides, it 
would be particularly relevant with respect to judicial review, especially since as has 
been pointed out both the SWIFT (Article 18) and PNR Agreements (Article 21) state 
that these agreements shall not create or confer any right or benefit on any person or 
entity, private or public. If the Umbrella Agreement applied retroactively, then the 
impossibility of claiming direct effect of SWIFT and PNR before a court of law could 
be solved by applying the Umbrella Agreement. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the review process of PNR and SWIFT Agreements can lead to the 
conclusion that demonstrates that the flaws in the transatlantic transfer of personal data 
are not yet overcome. In spite of the scandalous NSA revelations which showed a high 
possibility that the USA had accessed SWIFT and PNR data in breach of the agreement, 
the Commission has seemed fully satisfied. It therefore appears to have opted for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Non-Paper on State of play of negotiations on EU-US data protection ‘Umbrella Agreement’, supra 
note 29, at 9.  
52 V. Mitsilegas, supra note 30, at 313. 
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facilitating the rebuilding of trust in the transfer of data to the USA within the 
framework of PNR and SWIFT agreements. 
The Umbrella Agreement has been perceived as a key step for rebuilding trust in 
transatlantic transfer of data for law enforcement purposes after the NSA scandal. The 
agreed principles found in the Non-Paper of April 2014 show certain improvements to 
the main concerns as to data protection of EU citizens outlined in the most contentious 
data-transfer agreements between the EU and the US (namely, SWIFT and PNR). 
Having sketched the main challenges found in those agreements, it can be concluded 
that some improvements are found, inter alia in the limitations to transfers of data to 
third countries and international organisations or to automated-decision making. 
However, there is still a certain gap to reach EU data protection standards.  
An element of proportionality regarding data protection periods should be 
included and combined with judicial review. Besides, in light of the ruling in Digital 
Rights Ireland, it is submitted that differences in data retention periods should be 
included, particularly when data are transferred in bulk. Data of individuals not related 
to law-enforcement purposes should not be subject to the same data retention periods as 
those linked to it. Furthermore, nothing in the Non-Paper provides sufficient guarantees 
to the broad scope of purposes for which PNR data can be used.  
Finally, the fundamental question lies in judicial redress. The effectiveness of 
the improvements found in the Umbrella Agreement depend on whether EU citizens 
have effective means of judicial protection available, not only for intentional and wilful 
disclosure of information but also for other breaches of the administration. Whether this 
will be achieved remains to be seen, as remains whether mutual trust can be rebuilt after 
the NSA scandal. While the Commission may seem willing to reach an agreement with 
US authorities, the Parliament may and should be tougher if it wants to assert itself as a 
credible defender of fundamental rights of its electorate rather than as a schoolboy 
craving for a lead role at the Christmas play of external decision making.  
 
 
 
